

(b) (1)


APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JUL 2005

East Asia

REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Secret

212 RP ĀEA 77-013 12 July 1977



	-SECRET	
I		
l		

EAST ASIA 12 July 1977

CONTENTS

Indonesia:	Post-Election	Crackdown	10
5.1	+ 11 x - 15 - + - + 21,2413		
	- 1		

RP AEA 77-013 12 July 1977

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence.

Indonesia: Post-Election Crackdown

president Suharto's post-election domestic policy is reverting to the greater degree of authoritarianism that characterized the government's precampaign behavior. Suharto himself overruled his military advisers and held national elections this year not only to demonstrate the government's legitimacy but to inhibit opposition in a democratic manner. But the surprising developments of the campaign—the strength exhibited by Moslem opposition in the election, the staying power of Islamic ties, and the rise in disenchantment among students and young officers at the army's interference in the election—have combined with the government's inability to completely eliminate insurgency in East Timor and Irian Jaya to lead the regime to conclude that it must be prepared to impose even stricter controls.

With its 62.11 percent victory at the polls behind it, Jakarta has come down hard against antigovernment groups. Suharto has personally warned the leaders of the Moslem-dominated United Development Party that he will no longer tolerate their criticism of election skulduggery, namely army intimidation and rigged ballots. The government is taking the Moslem daily Pelita to court for misreporting which "created disorder" during the election campaign. While the question of news distortion is moct, what is clear is the government's intention of using the legal system—as opposed to outright banning—to inhibit opposition.

The government has also attempted to control student groups, particularly Moslem student groups, by applying a "velvet glove" policy: intimidating some students while conducting a propaganda campaign to influence others. The most notable feature of this campaign is an attempt to ridicule students by showing them pictures of damage they have done and then asking them if they can reconcile such action with their conscience. Other features of the campaign are lectures by participants in the 1974 Malari Incident—a massive student demonstration during the visit

RP AEA 77-013 12 July 1977

CECDET

f Japanese Prime Ministe ubdued by government for	r Tanaka which was bru ceswho are advising	the
tudents not to go too fa	r in their actions. S	uharto
as also overseen the strounterintelligence organ	eamlining of the domes	tic

RP AEA 77-013 12 July 1977 -Secret

Secret